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Abstract
A central axiom of political science research holds that government stability is a key determinant of effective
governance. Instability makes policymaking difficult and creates an environment that is inhospitable to foreign
or domestic economic investment and, in turn, economic growth. Latin America provides an excellent context
in which this relationship can be examined. The region was known for its political instability in the 1970s and
1980s, and the vast majority of countries implemented liberal economic reforms during the 1990s. The
expectation was that these reforms would yield the economic growth so desperately needed in the region and,
along with democratic reform, provide for the stability that prevails in other market-based democracies. The
present study demonstrates, however, that liberal economic reforms do not necessarily lead to system stability,
but instead require a concerted government effort to cushion the negative impact of these reforms and
integrate society with their newly-restructured domestic economy.
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Abstract
A central axiom of political science research holds that gov-
ernment stability is a key determinant of effective governance.
Instability makes policymaking difficult and creates an environ-
ment that is inhospitable to foreign or domestic economic invest-
ment and, in turn, economic growth.  Latin America provides an
excellent context in which this relationship can be examined.  The
region was known for its political instability in the 1970s and
1980s, and the vast majority of countries implemented liberal eco-
nomic reforms during the 1990s.  The expectation was that these
reforms would yield the economic growth so desperately needed in
the region and, along with democratic reform, provide for the sta-
bility that prevails in other market-based democracies.  The pres-
ent study demonstrates, however, that liberal economic reforms do
not necessarily lead to system stability, but instead require a con-
certed government effort to cushion the negative impact of these
reforms and integrate society with their newly-restructured domes-
tic economy.
Latin American governments, like governments throughout
the world, continuously strive to create and maintain system stabil-
ity.  According to political scientists Ernest A. Duff and John F.
McCamant, stability characterizes a political system that "man-
age[s] change within its structures … Political actors can depend
upon certain procedures and relationships which adjust to the
changing requirements of society" (Duff and McCamant 1125).
They should be able to adapt to any societal condition to maintain
adequate social welfare and public connectedness to and involve-
ment in society.  Individuals residing in stable political and social
environments are more likely to participate in the labor force and
live in developed urban areas.  They also reap the benefits of qual-
ity education and healthcare systems (ibid 1131-1132).  However,
in order to evaluate the degree to which Latin American countries
are stable, one must consider the factors contributing to overall sys-
tem stability.  
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This paper set out to demonstrate that there is a strong cor-
relation, if not a direct causal relationship, between the structure of
a country’s economy and its level of stability.  Throughout their
research, Duff and McCamant claim that "stability results, on the
one hand, from the views that the population has of the political
system and, on the other hand, from the strength of the system
itself" (Duff and McCamant 1125)1.   A system is strong when the
government is able to meet the changing needs of its citizens,
always promoting progress and development.  This strong system
is best accomplished if political actors operate autonomously, or
without the influence of outside actors.   However, in order to
understand how a government manages to enforce progress and
under what circumstances the people become involved in their
societies, one must look at other structural factors.  It is in this
regard that an economic system comes into play.  
Political economists like Eduardo Lora, Juan Luis Londiño,
and Barbara Stallings argue that in Latin America, where income
distributions are more skewed than anywhere else in the world, sta-
bility depends on liberalizing economic reform.  The question for
Latin Americans thus becomes how governments can bring togeth-
er market reforms and system stability.  It is likely that the answer
is by means of social programming.  If governments redistribute
funds to public education, health care, and social security while
they open markets, they will maintain strength and preside over cit-
izens who are satisfied with their position in and contributions to
society. 
This paper examined the likelihood that Latin American
countries will achieve system stability only if market liberalization
is accompanied by government social programming.  Due to the
fact that liberalization necessitates a minimal government presence
in the economic realm, political officials often lack the ability to
provide social and developmental assistance to the poor.  Therefore,
they must make a greater effort to center their political tasks on
implementing substantial social programming.  It could be
assumed, then, that if they successfully combine market and social
programming initiatives, government officials will be more likely
to maintain the support of citizen coalitions within their respective
countries.
The research findings, however, suggest that the interplay
between market liberalization and social programming is only a
starting point in determining Latin American levels of stability.
1 See Appendix 1.
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The strength of each respective country’s electoral coalitions, rather
than the economy or social initiatives, proves to be a better indica-
tor of a given system’s overall stability.  Economics and social pro-
gramming are important.  Both impact the extent to which govern-
ments have the ability to provide for their citizens.  However, sat-
isfaction with the government is reflected only in citizens’ willing-
ness to fulfill their prescribed roles in electoral coalitions.  The
coalitions’ success to some degree results from citizen reaction to
economic and social initiatives, and therefore proves to have more
of a direct causal link to system stability.    
Literature Review
Market Liberalization in Latin America
Political scientists Liliana Rojas-Suarez and Steven
Weisbrod claim that open markets allow citizens from all sectors of
society to experience a degree of financial prosperity.  So long as
market reforms "are aimed at reducing financial fragilities, they
produce a more stable fiscal and monetary environment, thereby
decreasing the amount of government resources needed to deal
with systematic financial difficulties" (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod
213).  Liberalization should minimize private financial barriers,
increase employment opportunities and wages, and expand upon
the availability of domestic as well as international economic trans-
actions like commodity importing and exporting.  By increasing
trade and banking services that are simultaneously conducive to the
needs of business owners and everyday consumers, open markets
should "encompass a number of sectors simultaneously … and thus
benefit a much larger segment of the population" (ibid).  Equal
opportunities for monetary payments and savings will increase
each Latin American country’s respective stability.  This stability,
however, comes at the expense of abandoning the economic mod-
els that existed until the 1980s.
Demonstrating Latin America’s shift away from what
Stallings and Peres refer to as the Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) model2 to an open economy ideally meas-
ures stability because of the market’s tendency to greatly determine
the extent to which citizens can prosper financially and socially.
2 In the ISI model, government expenditure comprised the majority of a country’s
GDP, there were extensive state regulations, and a great number of state-owned busi-
nesses.  It depicts what is commonly referred to as a “closed economy.”  See Stallings
and Peres.
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Governments’ "major overhaul of their economic approach"
(Stallings and Peres 38) influences Latin Americans’ prosperity to
such an extent that it is correlated with the success of political
regimes, democratic or authoritarian.  A country’s economic stand-
ing largely determines governments’ ability, although not always
their inclination or tendency, to disperse social assistance to pover-
ty-stricken individuals and maintain the support of the citizenry.
Every economic advance, according to Stallings and Peres, puts
increasing pressure on governments to "maintain economic
progress while simultaneously increasing the equity in societies"
(ibid 35).  So long as government programming counteracts the fact
that liberalization will do "little to close the huge divide between
the privileged few and the poor" (Thompson 3), open economic
policies can become a part of Latin America’s progression toward
development and system stability.  
Many researchers describe market liberalization as a logical
step in Latin American governments’ attempts to democratize.  The
democratic institutions "sputtering into life" (Shifter 114) have
been said to progress "not only because they have occurred in little
more than a decade, but also because they have taken place in some
of the continent’s poorest countries … and in the midst of civil
strife" (Karl 72).  Some extent of economic reform is possible in all
sectors of Latin America through democratization.  However, to
claim only fully democratic states benefit from market reform dis-
counts some authoritarian and military regimes’ reliance on the
open economy.  In Chile alone, the fact that Augusto Pinochet was
"an active adherent of economic policy reform" (Teichman 72) led
three military rulers to initiate market liberalization.  General
Lorenzo Gotuzzo became known for his removal of price controls,
Jorge Cauas for his cuts in government expenditure, and Sergio de
Castro for his vast privatization (ibid 74).  Democratic and author-
itarian regimes alike are concerned with the implications of market
liberalization, as it largely determines the extent to which they will
garner citizens’ approval.
According to Leslie Armijo and Philippe Faucher, the
wealthy and the impoverished believed that an open economy,
rather than the ISI system, resulted in societal progress.
Liberalized imports and domestic finances, open capital accounts,
privatization, and tax reform would allow for growth as well as sys-
tem stability.  This would remain true so long as governments could
keep their "veto points" (Armijo and Faucher 16) to a minimum by 
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maintaining throughout the liberalization process the social pro-
gramming that serves as a safety net for the poor.
The economic literature consulted in this study shows that
government regimes of all types have resorted to market liberaliza-
tion in an effort to ensure growth, and subsequently stability, with-
in their countries.  Officials relied on the profit resulting from the
increased internal and external capital flow of market liberalization.
They believed that their countries could truly develop only when
providing for the growing need for business and consumer activity.
If business is propelled without first taking into account the social
assistance that such activity will necessitate, however, market lib-
eralization will result in more societal harm than good.  Market lib-
eralization necessitates special attention to social programming
because such economic reforms not only cater specifically to the
wealthy, but also largely remove government officials from a soci-
ety’s economic realm.  Their lack of economic influence limits the
extent to which governments can assist the poor, making it impor-
tant that they put greater effort into centering the policies they do
control on social initiatives. 
Latin America’s Safety Net: Social Programming
Carol Graham asserts that, "by reducing the short-term dis-
locations caused by market-oriented reforms, safety nets ease the
political constraints that such reforms pose for new or fragile dem-
ocratic governments" (Graham 1995: 143).  State funded assistance
programs, like the Emergency Social Fund that operated in Bolivia
in the 1980s, assured the poor access to quality education, health
care, and workers benefits.  They also had the opportunity to par-
ticipate in society’s economic and political realms.  However, once
a country has initiated the process of market liberalization, the
upkeep of most social safety nets becomes difficult.  The econom-
ic focus shifts from being largely public to private, taking many
monetary initiatives out of the government’s direct control and
leaving politicians less room to formulate mass assistance initia-
tives.  Therefore, because market reform "provides a favorable con-
text for adopting new approaches to protecting the poor" (ibid 142),
governments must struggle to find a balance between liberal eco-
nomic policies and the social programming that often assures pub-
lic support.
Present-day Mexico is perhaps the best example of a Latin
American country in need of mass government social initiatives.  It
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once had a "strong reputation for effective state-led economic
development and sustained state-dominated political stability"
(Grindle 47), but has in the last year become a country in which cit-
izens constantly expect social crises.  The middle class faces the
threat of recession and an unstable currency, the economic status of
once well-off professionals increasingly drops below the poverty
line, and unemployment rates are rampant.  However, despite
Mexicans’ growing concern that "the middle class is disappearing"
(O’Brien 21), the country’s liberalized market keeps Mexico at the
forefront of international investors’ business ventures.  It, along
with Chile and El Salvador, is ranked among Latin America’s eco-
nomically-promising, "investment-grade countries."  
According to political economist Maria O’Brien, Latin
American countries’ market strengths and weaknesses are "in black
and white, with few shades of gray between them" (O’Brien 20).
Those that are strong, or black, are "able to access their market
almost at will on their own terms" (ibid).  While Latin American
countries are at different stages of development both socially and
politically, those like Mexico display strength in the international
realm with their open markets despite the citizens’ individual strug-
gles.  However, if these international market strengths are to persist,
citizens’ domestic plights need to be resolved.  To keep the middle
class from "falling, falling, falling" (Thompson 3), a situation initi-
ated by the uneven distribution of economic benefits,  the govern-
ment must reinstate the million jobs lost since Vicente Fox’s inau-
guration in 2000 and aid the growing number of families stricken
by poverty.  
Aid is attainable through increased efforts to more evenly
distribute wealth, increase education and health care spending, and
make more loans available to Mexican businesses.  However, it
necessitates that Mexico and Latin America as a whole no longer
"adopt the economic tenets of globalization as gospel" (ibid 4).
Governments will need to re-enter the economic realm to ensure
that liberalization will function only in conjunction with profound
social programs.  This re-entrance, however, greatly conflicts with
the notion of minimized government involvement in open markets.
The Latin American shift towards a liberal market economy
has decreased the importance of government intervention in eco-
nomic affairs.  As a result, "the role of the state in Latin American
economic development is undergoing fundamental reconsideration.
Even while political scientists have been bringing the state back in,
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economists have been busy trying to take it out" (Fishlow 61).
There is an increasing need to recognize the differing functions of
countries’ economic and political realms, giving the notion of Latin
American stability two prongs.  Market liberalization will indeed
bring about the stability of tax reform, limited government expen-
diture, and increased credit and interest rates to maintain monetary
flows throughout the system.  However, governments must find
some way to balance economically-induced stability with that of
the political realm.
For the last several decades, political scientists and econo-
mists have debated the extent to which a country’s government
should involve itself in the economy.  As evidenced by Carol
Graham’s theory, the way individual governments choose to answer
this question largely determines their political roles in society.
Should officials opt to back away from economic involvement in an
effort to liberalize and promote growth, they must be aware of the
increased need for attention to society’s poor.  Only when they
assure their citizens access to substantial education, health, and
social assistance can government officials be certain their countries
will thrive under a liberalized market system. 
The literature consulted in this study presents two theories,
economics and social programming, that conflict in their attempts
to explain Latin American system stability.  Theorists like Stallings
and Peres maintain the liberal economy is the most important fac-
tor in creating a stable system, while those like Graham claim that
even more important is social programming.  It becomes necessary,
then, to reconcile the opposing theories and determine the extent to
which they both play a role in maintaining a stable system.  
Methodology
Evaluating my hypothesis that economic reform and social
programming must play equal roles in creating system stability
involved a three-pronged methodology.  Data was collected on
individual Latin American countries’ stability levels, the extent to
which they operate liberal economies, and the degree of social pro-
gramming initiatives implemented by the government.  Indicators
used to represent each of the three areas mirrored and expanded
upon those used in past studies, and were taken from data compiled
by various international financial organizations.3
3 The organizations consulted include the World Bank, United Nations, the
Economic Commission for Latin America, and USAID.
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Measuring Stability
The extent to which market liberalization and social programming
influences Latin American system stability was determined through
testing initially based on Duff and McCamant’s 1968 model for
system stability.  Throughout their research, Duff and McCamant
measured stability in the 19 major Latin American countries4 by
means of two indicators of societal progress and development:
social welfare and social mobilization.  Together, these indicators
effectively analyze "the attitudes of the population and the capabil-
ities of the political system" (Duff and McCamant 1126).  Welfare,
or a country’s ability to "fulfill some basic human needs" (ibid
1131), refers to the resources necessary for survival and economic
and social advancement.  It is defined in terms of overall econom-
ic intake, level of education, and extent of health care.  The mobi-
lization to which Duff and McCamant refer is the extent to which
individuals are involved with and informed about the societies in
which they live.5 Once data for the individual aspects of social
welfare and mobilization were obtained, the authors proceeded to
create total stability index scores for each country and concluded
their study by ranking them from most to least stable.
The methods Duff and McCamant used to measure Latin
American system stability formed the foundations of this study.
However, they were ultimately updated and expanded upon to
reflect 2002 statistics and encompass indicators of the typical open
economy and government social programming.  It manages to not
only rank each of the 19 countries’ stability in terms of social wel-
fare and mobilization, but also explain the variations in their
respective rankings.  Through taking into account the impact of a
liberal, open economy, for example, this reasoning largely reflects
the authors’ secondary claim that 
the most important reason why economic development 
sometimes fails to produce political stability is that while 
4 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela
5 The specific measurements of social welfare used in Duff and McCamant’s article
include GDP per capita, percent of literacy, and percent of 13-18 year olds in
school, daily calories and protein per capita, and doctors and hospital beds per
10,000 people.  Mobilization was measured in terms of newspapers, radios, and tel-
evisions per 1,000 people, percent of the economically active population in labor
unions, and percent of urbanization.
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the economy is making it possible for the political and 
economic systems to satisfy the demands of the 
population, it is also raising the level of expectations 
(Duff and McCamant 1127).
Expectations were largely translated into citizens’ need for
increased social programming to offset the often devastating effects
of market liberalization on their overall well-being.  Nonetheless,
this study, like in 1968, necessitated an analysis of modern-day
rates of social welfare and mobilization throughout Latin America.
Rather than being a final step in the research process, however, it
characterized the beginning.
Indicators of social welfare and mobilization were like
those used in Duff and McCamant’s research in that they reflected
Latin American countries’ levels of economic intake, education,
and health care.  They also showed the extent of citizens’ access to
communication, the labor force, and urban living environments.
However, the lack of some data availability caused certain indica-
tors, while in accordance with the 1968 study’s intentions, to differ
from the originals.  In measuring social welfare, for example, the
indicator for the percent of 13-18 year olds in school was replaced
by the percent of high school-aged citizens actually in high school.
The health indicators of calorie and protein allowances were
replaced by life expectancy and infant mortality rates per 1,000
births, and health care services were represented by people per doc-
tor and people per hospital bed.6 The figures were then combined
into two index scores for system stability, which were compared
with each country’s economic liberalization and the extent to which
individual governments aided their citizens with "safety nets," or
social programs.
Measuring Economic Liberalization
Liberalization initiatives were measured in accordance with
indicators employed by Stallings and Peres.  It was their contention
that an open system consisting of liberalized imports and domestic
finances, open capital accounts, privatization, and tax reform would
increase international import and export interaction, thus lending to
the countries’ overall stability.  It was in this way that government 
6 Data for these indicators was obtained from the United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, the World Bank, and the Economic Commission for
Latin America.
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officials would "help to lower both the poverty that had climbed to
new levels during the 1980s and the inequality that was higher than
any other part of the world" (Stallings and Peres 39).  This study
employs percent of personal and corporate income taxes, private
investment, domestic credit and interest rates, government expen-
diture, and inflation rates as indicators of a liberal market, and thus
government counter-poverty initiatives.7 Data was translated into
an interval level scale, and each country was placed into a "liberal-
ization category" for each indicator based on its individual value.
These categories were labeled "low," "middle," and "high." 
In the most open economies, it is expected that tax rates,
government expenditure, and inflation remain low.  Private invest-
ment, domestic bank credits, and interest rates should remain high,
as they would thus signify a greater level of capital flow through-
out the economic system.  Greater capital flow is a desirable char-
acteristic of progressing societies, but it is equally important that
researchers keep in mind the fact that "the poor, or particular groups
of the poor, are adversely affected by certain adjustment measures.
The most severe…are prolonged economic crises that necessitate
adjustment" (Graham 1994: 4).  The fact that impoverished citizens
stand to struggle with various liberalization initiatives makes it nec-
essary to determine the extent to which the open economy must
work in conjunction with social programs to maintain stability.
Measuring Social Programs
Throughout her writing, Graham maintains "the extent of
safety-net programs depends to a large extent on political factors"
(Graham 1995: 143).  Throughout the liberalization process, gov-
ernments must provide citizens with demand-based social funds
like Bolivia’s ESF and Chile’s Fund for Solidarity and Social
Investment8 to minimize the negative effects of skewed income
distributions and general economic hardship among the lower
classes.  This study employed the following variables as typical
indicators of government social programming: the percent of gov-
ernment expenditure on social services, the percent of the GDP
geared toward education spending, the percent of the GNP geared 
7 Data for these indicators was obtained from the World Bank and the 2001 CIA
World Fact Book.
8 The Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment was a government-sponsored
social assistance program that provided Chile’s poorest communities with a series
of outreach programs and ministries.
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toward health spending, and the percent of total revenue comprised
of social security taxes.9 The greater the percentage in each of
these areas, which were eventually combined to reflect a single
index score for each country, the greater the extent of government-
sponsored programs in Latin America.  More important, however,
is the extent to which high levels of social programming can inter-
act with highly-liberalized markets to produce system stability. 
Data Analysis
In order to remain consistent with Stallings and Peres’ find-
ings, data employed by this study should reflect a positive correla-
tion between Latin American countries’ degree of market liberal-
ization and their social welfare and mobilization.  It is also impor-
tant, however, to ascertain the degree to which it is necessary for
governments to initiate social programs to cushion their liberaliza-
tion efforts.  Therefore, in examining data trends, I sought out find-
ings that were consistent with the following possible relationships
between market liberalization, social programming, and stability:
• High levels of market liberalization, high levels of social pro-
gramming, and high stability, reflecting that liberalization needs to
work in conjunction with social programming to produce a stable
system.
• Low levels of market liberalization, low levels of social program-
ming, and low stability, again reflecting that liberalization works in
conjunction with social programming to produce stability.
• High levels of market liberalization, middle or low levels of social
programming, and high stability, reflecting that liberalization is
needed to produce system stability, but that social programming is
not greatly influential.
• Low levels of market liberalization, high levels of social pro-
gramming, and high stability, reflecting that social programming,
rather than liberal markets, is the determining factor in a country’s
stability level.
9 Data was obtained from the World Bank’s 2001 World Development Report and
World Development Indicators.
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How liberal are Latin America’s markets?
Data shows that Latin America’s markets are by and large
only moderately liberalized (See Appendix 2).  The only indicator
reflecting a great degree of liberalization is the region’s high aver-
age of private investment.  Interest rates and bank credit, both of
which should be high in a liberalized economy, only fall in "the
middle of the road," as does the average rate of government expen-
diture, which should ideally be low.  The region as a whole has high
personal and corporate income tax rates, and appears to show no
dominant trend in its inflation levels.
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Important in this aspect of the project however, is the extent
to which each of the 19 Latin American countries is individually
liberalized (See Tables 1.1 and 1.2).  In accordance with the origi-
nal standards set forth by Stallings and Peres, the countries with the
most liberalized economies appear to be Bolivia and Ecuador, two
of the region’s poorest countries.  They are unlike the other coun-
tries in that they both boast low personal income tax rates, and,
respectively, middle and low corporate income tax rates.
Moreover, while Bolivia displays a great deal of liberalization
through high interest rates and low inflation, Ecuador is liberalized
primarily through high levels of private investment and domestic
banking credits.  Examples of moderately-liberalized countries
include Mexico, whose high privatization and interest rates are off-
set by high tax rates, low banking credit, and only "middle" infla-
tion rates.  Also in this category is Uruguay, with high private
investment, interest rates, and low inflation but high government
expenditure and corporate income taxes.
Countries with little liberalization include Costa Rica and
Venezuela.  Costa Rica has high taxes, government expenditure,
and inflation, which is offset only by middle-range interest and
credit ratings.  Venezuela has the same high tax rates as Costa Rica,
but adds to its market deficiencies low private investment and back
credit and high levels of inflation.  According to Stallings and
Peres, it should then follow that in ranking these six "example"
countries, Bolivia and Ecuador should be the most stable.  Next, we
would expect to see Mexico and Uruguay, and, lastly, Costa Rica
and Venezuela.  Due to the fact that some literature theorizes that
stability cannot result from liberalization without government inter-
vention, however, the validity of Stallings and Peres’ argument
requires an analysis of Latin American countries’ level of social
programming.    
Do liberalized markets work in conjunction with 
social programs?
Social programming data and index scores (see Tables 2.1
and 2.2) reflect that the Latin American region is led by Uruguay
and Panama in terms of high government fund allocation to social
services, education, health, and social security.  Falling at the bot-
tom of the scale is the highly liberalized Ecuador and, lower still,
Paraguay.  The countries whose rankings are most important in this
portion of the study, however, are those who epitomize the three 
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levels of Latin American market liberalization.  Highly liberal
Bolivia received a programming index score of 3.84, the fourth
highest of the 19 countries.  Equally liberal Ecuador, however,
ranked at -4.57, the second lowest.  Uruguay, which is only moder-
ately liberalized, had the highest programming score of 7.66, and
Mexico, also moderately liberalized, had an average programming
score of .36.  Costa Rica’s low market liberalization failed to pre-
vent it from achieving the fifth highest programming score of 2.39,
and Venezuela’s low liberalization level corresponded to an equal-
ly low level of programming.  It ranks 13th, with a score of -1.54.
The combined market liberalization and social program-
ming data for the "example countries" leads one to assume the fol-
lowing:
• In Bolivia, high liberalization and high social programming
should combine to result in high social welfare and mobilization,
the indicators of stability.
• Should Ecuador’s high liberalization level and low social pro-
gramming combine to produce high levels of stability, the country
will be consistent with Stallings’ theory that market liberalization is
the most important factor in determining system stability.  Social
programming, then, would be all but discounted.
•  Uruguay’s moderate degree of market liberalization and extreme-
ly high social programming should combine to produce at least rel-
atively high stability.
• In Mexico, moderate market liberalization and moderate social
programming should produce only moderate stability.
• Should Costa Rica have high stability, it will disprove Stallings
theory, discounting market liberalization solely in favor of social
programming.
• Venezuela’s low levels of market liberalization and social pro-
gramming should produce low overall stability.
The stability trends, however, seem to largely discount
Stallings’ and Peres’ argument as well as Carol Graham’s assertion
that social programming is a necessary precursor to Latin American
stability.  
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How stable are Latin American countries?
Social Welfare
Social welfare data and index scores (See Tables 3.1 and
3.2) show that this area of Latin American stability is led by
Uruguay, with the highest score of 6.46.  In this case, the original
hypothesis appears be correct.  Sufficient levels of market liberal-
ization and a high degree of social programming in Uruguay com-
bine to produce a stable system.  However, the same cannot be said
of the five other countries employed as the "example cases" in this
study.  Ecuador’s high level of market liberalization and low social
programming produce a relatively low amount of social welfare.
The country is rated 12th with a score of -1.01, which all but dis-
counts Stallings’ assertion that liberal markets are a necessary pre-
cursor to system stability.
Costa Rica, however, does the opposite.  The country has
low liberalization, high social programming, and a relatively high
degree of social welfare.  It ranks 8th out of 19 countries with a
score of 1.49.  It would seem to show that social programming is
more conducive to stability than market liberalization, but this the-
ory, too, is discounted by the cases of Mexico and Venezuela.
Mexico’s average liberalization and programming produce rela-
tively high social welfare.  It ranks fifth with a score of 2.69.
Venezuela’s low liberalization and programming, on the other
hand, fail to prevent the country from achieving high social wel-
fare.  It ranks seventh with a score of 1.97.  Similarly, the fact that
Bolivia had a high degree of market liberalization and social pro-
gramming did not prevent extremely low social welfare.  It ranks
17th, above only Guatemala and Haiti, with a score of -4.80.  One
can conclude from these findings that something in addition to mar-
ket liberalization and social programming must play a role in deter-
mining a country’s stability.  The data on social mobilization con-
firms this. 
Social Mobilization
Social mobilization data and index scores (See Tables 4.1
and 4.2) show that Uruguay’s stability level dominates the Latin
American region.  It holds the highest mobilization index score, a
value of 18.63, and is well above second-place Argentina, which is
valued at 12.95.  However, Uruguay is again the only country that
62 Market Liberalization
appears to conform to Stallings and Peres’ contentions about the
importance of market liberalization and Graham’s assertion of the
need for social programming.  Ecuador’s high market liberalization
and low social programming translate into only average mobiliza-
tion, a ninth-place score of 1.59, and Costa Rica directly follows
with the average score of -2.31.  There is a large gap between this
country and its predecessor is in itself rather excessive.  However,
the data for Bolivia and Venezuela best shows the inaccuracy of
Stallings and Graham’s contentions.  
Despite low market liberalization and social programming,
Venezuela nonetheless brandishes an extremely high level of mobi-
lization stability.  It ranks third, with an index score of 12.53.  On
the other end of the spectrum, Bolivia’s high liberalization and pro-
gramming rates do not change the fact that the country has a mobi-
lization rate that is even lower than its welfare.  It ranks 16th, above
only Paraguay, Guatemala, and Haiti, with a score of -8.99.
Therefore, regardless of the fact that Mexico’s average mobiliza-
tion matches its average liberalization and programming, the over-
all data necessitates that researchers find an alternative explanation
for Latin American stability levels.  Even in Uruguay, where there
appears to be a positive correlation between market liberalization,
social programming, and stability, it is likely that some intervening
factor plays a role.
Searching for an Alternative Explanation for
Latin American Stability
Coalitions in Latin America
Several political scientists go beyond evaluating Latin
American stability in terms of market liberalization and social pro-
gramming to look instead at the impact of coalitions.  They refer to
electoral coalitions between a society’s poor, elite, and governing
officials.  According to Edward L. Gibson, Latin America’s politi-
cal systems are dependent upon the formation of metropolitan
coalitions to give support to a ruling party’s development strategies.
Also needed is a peripheral coalition functioning "largely as an
electoral coalition, which carries the burden of generating electoral
majorities" (Gibson 340).  The two groups rely on the membership
of both the wealthy people who stand to benefit from participation
in coalitions and the poor who do not.
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While the metropolitan coalition consists of urban citizens
from well-off, professional sectors, the electoral coalitions rely on 
individuals who are for the most part poor, rural dwellers.
The secret of governments’ success was due largely 
to their ability to make effective the dualistic nature 
of their societies in the coalitional realm by bringing 
together the most antagonistic sectors of society and 
giving them distinct tasks in the creation and 
reproduction of populist power (Gibson 342).
Local elites in the metropolitan coalition were given control
over the economic realm.  The rural poor were expected to mobi-
lize in favor of their initiatives and, subsequently, the policy initia-
tives of the government.  However, in many Latin American coun-
tries where the poor outnumber the wealthy, it became difficult to
engage the mass citizenry in such mobilization efforts.  They
opposed the inequalities of the system, and rejected many social
programs and economic reforms simply because they were not
made on their terms.  Successful coalitions were thus often unat-
tainable.
Political economist Hector E. Schamis describes throughout
his writings "the politics of neutralizing the losers [and] empower-
ing the winners" (Schamis 237-238).  The losers to which he refers
are peasants, who have little say in development and reform efforts,
and the winners are the elites who control virtually all of society’s
social and governing aspects.  The hierarchical power structure
makes the fact that Latin American governments are withdrawing
from the economic realm and implementing social programs irrel-
evant to their overall stability.  While governments focused on mar-
ket reforms may to some extent limit rent-seeking behavior10, the
fact remains that dominant citizen groups have more say in politi-
cal initiatives due to their societal influence.  "The politicization of
economic [and other] policies leads to inefficient allocation and
resources are continuously wasted in efforts to influence policy-
makers" (ibid 240).  Beyond the material resources, impoverished
citizens often feel elites and government officials overlook their
human resources, or contributions to and opinions about society.
This feeling more often than not leads to displeasure with and
revolts against society’s functionality, creating instability. 
10 Rent-seeking, or clientelism, refers to the tendency for governments to do favors
for or cater to dominant societal groups in exchange for political support.
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Applying Coalition Failures and Successes to 
Specific Countries
Bolivia
Bolivia is perhaps the Latin American country that best
exemplifies the effects of failed metropolitan and peripheral coali-
tions.  It is highly unstable regardless of high levels of market lib-
eralization and social programming.  Elite opposition, along with
the international shift away from drug reliance, convinced govern-
ing officials to look down upon and punish peasants who rely on
cultivation as an income base.  These peasants, therefore, more
often than not revolt against their "superiors" than support their pol-
icy initiatives.
Coca profits allow the residents of Bolivia’s coca-producing
regions access to hospitals, roads, schools, low-income housing,
and social services necessary for basic functioning.  "The national
government did not have the resources to compete, and the other-
wise poor population did not ignore, the apparent benefits accruing
to itself and the region in general" (Menzel 5).  Over one million
Bolivians, by means of their involvement in coca production, not
only have the funds necessary to purchase simple commodities, but
also a relative sense of stability and desire for political involve-
ment.  "When growth is at a crawl, income per head has shrunk,
unemployment is increasing, and the value of real wages continues
to decline" (Keller 4), citizens must rely on income-producing
methods by which they have continuously been supported.  The
income prospects associated with land exploitation and cultivation
have long cushioned the peasantry’s grim circumstances.
"Coca production is but one more link in the long chain of
peasants’ fight for survival" (Justiniano 100).  It provides them with
a means of income while they migrate from area to area, realizing
that stable, centrally-located work is difficult to come by.  Their liv-
ing standards are comparable to the lowest levels in Africa, ranging
from general health and life expectancy to educational deficits, and
leaders’ inability to continuously provide for their growing needs
only widens the circle of rural poverty.  Therefore, "peasants have
nothing to lose.  As long as coca provides a family livelihood, they
will protect their coca crop at all costs" (ibid).  The lengths to which
they will go to protect this life-saving crop are virtually limitless,
evidenced by their non-compliance with the Zero-Option policy.  
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"Growers promised civil war if President Sánchez de
Lozada tried to dislodge Chepare residents" (Lehman 212) from the
coca fields, and eventually forced the cultivation process to return
to "business as usual" (ibid).  This was significant for peasants
because they maintained a degree of involvement in the profitable
coca industry and made their often overlooked presence known
throughout the country.  They will continue to fight for this recog-
nition as long as elites and government officials downplay the
importance of their means of subsistence.    
Bolivia’s high liberalization and social programming initia-
tives were an overall failure in terms of stability because their ben-
efits were aimed at the wrong sector of the population.  While
social assistance efforts like the ESF briefly increased the overall
employment and wage rate, and made improvements to the coun-
try’s infrastructure, middle- and upper-class citizens continue to be
the primary recipients of any market gains and opportunities for
social advancement because they are thought to contribute to soci-
etal development in the most productive manner.  The poor, on the
other hand, rely on "unproductive" coca cultivation as a self-initi-
ated, informal social program.  
Uruguay
While Bolivia’s lack of cooperation between the elite and
poor likely explains its low level of system stability, Uruguay’s sur-
prisingly high levels of social welfare can in some part be attributed
to the peaceful coexistence of citizens across all social classes.  "By
Latin American standards, Uruguay is a relatively egalitarian soci-
ety with a large middle class …. The incidence of extreme wealth
and poverty still approximated the pattern of developed countries
rather than that of developing countries" (Hudson and Meditz 69).
While there is indeed an upper and lower class in Uruguayan soci-
ety, the differences between the two groups are not strongly defined
and neither is thought to have a greater government influence.
Both stand to benefit from market initiatives and government-spon-
sored social programs, and both are needed equally for electoral
and policy support.  This is evidenced by the fact that unlike the
social elites in bordering Argentina, Uruguay’s landholders "never
achieved the social and political preeminence” (ibid 70).
Moreover, across the country, "the urban-rural divide was no longer
very pronounced" (ibid 71).  The virtual equality that characterized
the relationship between classes was largely translated into cooper-
ation between Uruguay’s political parties.
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Politicians know they will play an active role in Uruguay’s
political realm regardless of whether they are members of the dom-
inant governing party.  With coparticipación11 "parties refrained
from systematic opposition, thereby helping to ease the legislative
passage of government policies" (Hudson and Meditz 173).
Members participated equally in the legislative process regardless
of opposing ideologies, but even the differences between them
were not profound.  Ideological differences result from allegiance
to specific leaders and traditions rather than ties to particular polit-
ical viewpoints, and social status and income are rarely labeled as
the determining factors in individuals’ party affiliations (ibid).
Coalitions do exist, but the same equality among parties can be
seen among the electoral and metropolitan realms.  The fact that the
government calls on equal involvement from all citizen classes
gives one group no reason to oppose the initiatives of the other, cre-
ating a stable society in which government leaders can provide for
their citizens’ well-being.  
Mexico
Mexico, like Uruguay, has a highly inclusive societal struc-
ture in which members of all social and economic groups can play
a role in government policy-making.  However, the process by
which this political involvement comes about is chaotic, likely
explaining the country’s moderate stability level.  The Mexican
governing system is by and large run by society’s elite, membership
to which "is based on the possession of resources, sometimes polit-
ical and sometimes economic" (Rudolph 281).  Elites have more
access to prominent political officials and sometimes the means for
financial growth.  The "chaos" involved in the functionality of
Mexican elites, however, comes as a result of the fact that the label
of "elite," unlike in other Latin American countries, has never been
limited to society’s professionals or the most economically well-
off. 
Elite classification is instead based on the principle of
"mutual accommodation" (Rudolph 281), and accurately describes
members of the middle class, business interests, union members,
and even the Mexican peasantry.  "The heterogeneity of this elite
largely accounted for what analysts have described as the policy
incoherence of the government and the shifting of emphasis from 
11 Coparticipación refers to Uruguay’s tendency to allow members of its two major
parties to equally take part in governing the country.
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reform during one sexenio12 to consolidation and conservatism in
the next" (ibid).  The system brings opposing coalitions together
into a single group.  However, the fact that each often has different
interests based on their respective societal placement makes suc-
cinct policy agendas and passage difficult to accomplish.  Mexico’s
stability is as a result often unable to reach its utmost levels.
Bolivia, Uruguay, and Mexico are representative of the
three varying levels of system stability present throughout Latin
America.  When their political systems are analyzed together, they
show that the functionality of citizen coalitions play a large role in
determining the extent to which any one country can achieve sta-
bility.  It is apparent, then, that stability necessitates the existence
of coalitions prior to any substantial market reforms or government
social programs.  This is true because functional coalitions, more so
than the dysfunctional, will create a political environment in which
governing officials will more easily be able to implement policies
necessary for their desired social and economic reforms.
Conclusion
In their 1968 study, Duff and McCamant claimed that
"instability is brought about by a population that considers the
political system to be illegitimate and/or ineffective, and by politi-
cal institutions which cannot meet the needs and demands of soci-
ety or lack the capacity to adjust" (Duff and McCamant 1125).
Legitimacy and effectiveness, as demonstrated by Stallings, Peres,
and Graham, can be restored in part by government efforts to liber-
alize the economy or install ample social programs within society.
However, the results of this study show that society’s citizen coali-
tions are more important in determining governments’ ability to
maintain stability.  Only these coalitions will determine the ease
with which governments can make economic, social, or other rele-
vant policies.
Metropolitan coalitions were noted for "incorporating new
social actors into the political process" (Gibson 366), and the
peripheral coalition for "extending the parties’ territorial reach
throughout the more economically backward regions" (ibid).
However, as evidenced by countries like Bolivia, coalitions
between the two sectors become dysfunctional if they do not have
equal opportunities to influence societal and government happen-
12 Sexenio refers to a presidential administration.  See Rudolph 283.
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ings, lessening stability.  Should governments want to create a more 
stable Latin America in the future, they must follow Uruguay’s
example and incorporate social and economic initiatives with the
assurance that divisions among the citizenry will not put a damper








APPENDIX 1:  Stability Measurement Flaws
Throughout the course of my research, it became increas-
ingly apparent that Duff and McCamant’s work stopped short of
measuring political system stability.  Several political scientists
indicate that social welfare and mobilization are necessary charac-
teristics of a stable system, but are not an adequate measure of sta-
bility.  M. Stephen Weatherford claims stability results when citi-
zens view a political system as legitimate, giving it high approval
ratings.  Factors contributing to legitimacy include overall govern-
ment accountability, efficiency, procedural fairness, and distribu-
tive fairness (Weatherford 150).  Harry Eckstein adds that the
notion of stability "implies effective decision making … in pursuit
of shared political goals or in adjustment to changing conditions"
(Eckstein 184).  In order to function properly, government policies
must reflect the needs and wants of the people.  
The authors claim (1) that high social welfare and mobi-
lization are precursors to people’s political system approval, and (2)
that measuring approval, and thus stability, requires collecting pub-
lic opinions.  The second assertion presents a problem for studies
of the Latin American region due to the lack of sufficient public
opinion data.  One available source, Ronald Inglehart’s 1997 World
Values Survey, asks respondents to rate the current political system,
determine the extent to which government officials act in the inter-
est of all citizens, and rate their satisfaction with current political
officials’ job performance.  However, such questions are problem-
atic because they focus on satisfaction with current administrations
rather than the political system in general.  Moreover, Inglehart’s
data set includes only 8 of the 19 countries examined in this
research project, impeding my ability to obtain complete results.  It
was therefore necessary to measure stability along the lines of Duff
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